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FREE SPEECH (19 4 9 _i 9 52): SLOGANS V.

STATES' RIGHTS
HENRY

M.

KIrrLEsON AND

J.

ALLEN SMITH

"It seems hypercritical to strike down local
laws on their faces for want of standards
when we have no standards."*
The decisions of the last three terms of the United States Supreme

Court indicate confusion in the solution of free speech cases. Ad-

mittedly many problems are involved in any situation important
enough to reach the Supreme Court, but the justices seem unable to
form a strong and clearly oriented coalition to solve, by the appli-

cation of readily understood doctrines and practices, a variety of important questions. Can a person express himself unrestrained by state
and federal officials and, if so, to what degree? Is the protection of
speech more sacred at one level of government than at the other,
equally sacred at both, or, as some observers are suggesting, sacred
at neither? Is the protection of speech more jealously guarded than
other civil liberties, such as privacy; and, perhaps more remotely, are
personal liberties entitled to more protection than property rights?1
During this period the Court decided seventeen cases involving in

whole or substantial part the question of free speech; 2 and in these
*Jackson, J., dissenting in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 309 (1951).
1FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT, C. 1 (1949), is an excellent
study posing these and other questions; see Smith, Book Review, 3 U. OF FLA. L.
REv. 267 (1950). The problem of the "double standard" is analyzed in Freund,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV.533 (1951). Learned Hand,
in Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 COL. L. REv. 696,
especially at 698 (1946), questions the propriety of treating property rights as inferior to personal rights even if such a distinction between the rights can be made.
For Learned Hand's early view on speech see Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed.
535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 245 Fed. 102 (2d Cir. 1917). For his later and more
conservative view see United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
2Although this article touches on freedom of press and mentions such cases
as Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
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judgments the justices filed more than fifty opinions. Only five of
these decisions were unanimous, and to only one opinion did all of
the justices sitting subscribe. Such divergence recalls the quip of
John Stuart Mill: "The practical question, where to place the limithow to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence
and social control- is a subject on which nearly everything remains
to be done." 3
This paper limits its glances principally to those cases decided
within the past three years. 4 To attempt to restate free speech systematically from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the latest alleged aggression of a Jehovah's Witness would be unprofitable and
stale. Entire books fill this need.5 Excellent articles contain periodic
summings up; 6 other studies exhaust single concepts. 7 Moreover, three
(1931), the thesis is limited to speech. See Richardson, Freedom of Expression and
the Function of the Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1,n.1 (1951), in which the author in
a similar study sees no difference in speech or press. But see Jackson, J., dissenting
in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951), to the effect that precedents on
prior restraint of the press "cannot reasonably be transposed to the street-meeting
field." Religion, an equally important field, was recently exhaustively treated by
Lake in Freedom to Worship Curiously, 1 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 203 (1948). The
major development since that time is Zorach v. Clauson, 72 Sup. Ct. 679 (1952),
which qualifies McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and in
which the New York "released time" program for religious instructions is upheld.
3Mill, Essay on Liberty, in THE MODERN READERS' SERIES 8 (1926).
4Professor Chafee considers that a new period in free speech began in 1945,
which period he calls the Period of Renewed Struggle and Subtle Suppressions;
see Thirty-five Years with Freedom of Speech, a lecture delivered at Columbia
University March 12, 1952. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), matches
any case in protecting free speech; it may be called the high-water mark, rivaling
the theoretical tour de force of Rutledge, J., in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945). It seems more appropriate to consider the 1948-1949 term as the dividing
point, since the demises of Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., concurred at that time.
See Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-from Schenck to Dennis, 52 COL. L.
REV. 313, 320 (1952), in which the period July 1949, is described as closing the
mature Roosevelt Court.

5E.g.,

CHAFEE,

FREE

SPEECH

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

(1941),

GOVERNMENT

AND

(1947); MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH (1948).
6Especially helpful are Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under the First
Amendment: A Resume, 30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920); Freund, The Supreme Court and
Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1951); Goodrich, Does the Constitution Protect
Free Speech?, 19 MICH. L. REV. 487 (1921); Murphy, Free Speech and the Interest
in Local Law and Order, I J. PUB. LAw 40 (1952).
7E.g., Antieu, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of its Applicability,
48 MICH. L. REv. 811 (1950); Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and
MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1952], Art. 1
FREE SPEECH
years are sufficient for scope: the recent opinions contain everything
from a Jefferson letter to Abigail Adams to internal dissensions over
the correct exegesis of selected quotations from Holmes.
PICKETING

An approximate degree of harmony among the justices is apparent
in situations involving picketing that is lacking in other cases concerned with speech. Perhaps this relative absence of discord results
from a recognition by several justices, particularly Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that vis-a-vis speech, picketing - to borrow Professor Freund's
phrase - is a hybrid.8 To a considerable extent the Court still explains its behavior on the verbal level of Thornhill v. Alabama9 and
Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company. 0 Frankfurter, however,
is taking the initiative in developing a new rule. His famous decision in the Ritter's Cafe case," in which he began to assert his
leadership in this field only two years after Thornhill, should by now
be included as the third of the most significant three holdings.
Thornhill gave rise to the notion that picketing is speech and is
therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement by the states.12 Giboney unanimously issued forth the proposiPresent Danger" Rule, 38 VA. L. Rs.v. 143, 315 (1952); Chafee, Freedom of Speech
in War Time, 32 HARv. L. REv. 932 (1919); Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present
Danger," 27 NoT=a DAME LAW. 325 (1952); Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951); Daykin, The Employer's Right of Free Speech
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 IowA L. REv. 212 (1952); Frank, The United States
Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 165 (1952); Gorfinkel and Mack,
Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REv.
475 (1951); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment and Evils that Congress Has a
Right to Prevent, 26 IND. L.J. 477 (1951); Mendelson, supra note 4; Nathanson,
The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-DangerTest, 63 HARv. L. REv.
1167 (1950); Rehmus, Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 30 ORE. L. REv. 115
(1951); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COL. L.
REv. 727 (1942); Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1950).
SQuoted in International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950),
from FREUND, UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1949). See Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950).
9310 U.S. 88 (1940).
10336 U.S. 490 (1949).
"Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
12Murphy, J., wrote the opinion for a nearly unanimous Court; only McReynolds, J., dissented, without opinion. An earlier Brandeis dictum led the way,
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937); see discussion in
Cox, supra note 7, at 592, n.77; 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 153 (1949).
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tion that even peaceful picketing will not be protected if it is part
of an illegal act. 13 The problem then becomes one of definition and
presumption. How far can the states - and Congress - go in defining
illegal acts?
In Ritter's Cafe the Court upheld the right of a state to control
industrial disputes in a reasonable manner, even when the control
limits peaceful picketing. 14 This decision brought a dissent from
Mr. Justice Black, who felt that peaceful picketing should not be
subjected to regulation, however reasonable, unless, as he later
added in Giboney, the picketing is directed toward the breach of
a well-established law.15 The Frankfurter approach proceeds
on an ad hoc basis. The state has great power to say
what is legal and what is illegal; these declarations can come
from either the legislature or the state judiciary. The United
States Supreme Court will weigh the balance between this state
13A state statute outlawed combinations in restraint of trade and provided
criminal penalties. Pickets were successfully enjoined from attempts to force ice
distributors from selling ice to nonunion peddlers. See the discussion by Frank,
The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. OF CI. L. REv. 1, 406 (1949),
in which he succinctly points out that Giboney limits the object for which one may
picket, not how one pickets. For an interesting early discussion in the area left
between Thornhill and Giboney see Note, 16 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 701 (1949). Florida
has a decision in line with Giboney, Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So.2d
899 (1950).
14Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), a 5-4 decision, sustained a narrowly drawn injunction. Ritter hired a contractor to erect
a building; nonunion men were employed. In protest, the union picketed a cafe
owned by Ritter in another part of town; the cafe had no connection with the
building under construction. The state court held that the picketing violated the
state anti-trust law. A year before, in AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), Frankfurter, J., had condemned as a free-speech abridgement a similar state court injunction. In Swing there was no employer-employee dispute; the pickets were not
employees. The purpose of the picketing was to unionize the shop. The state
court had enjoined the picketing on the basis that there was no labor dispute.
Since the Ritter picketing was peaceful and sought to force no violation of the law,
the injunction obviously imposed a restriction that would not have been permitted
under Thornhill. Ritter expressly refused to remove picketing from free speech;
yet in Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 59 (D. Kan. 1945), a federal district
judge observed, ". . . the 'clear and present danger test' as applied to peaceful
picketing in the Thornhill case gave way to the 'reasonable basis' test in the
Ritter case." Cf. dissenting opinion of Reed, J., in Ritter, 315 U.S. 722, 738 (1942):
"Until today, orderly, regulated picketing has been within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
15315 U.S. 722, 729 (1942).
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power and individual liberty; it will not consider the process as an
"exercise in absolutes" 16 but will apply to each new set of circumstances the closest factual situation already adjudicated.
One recent case, Cole v. Arkansas,17 involved actual violence and
concerted efforts to bring about violence. Consequently, it was dearly
outside the protection of Thornhill; and the Court unanimously denied relief to the disputant, who had been jailed for his reprehensible conduct toward fellow workers who refused to strike.'8 The case
is one of slight importance, and then largely for what Mr. Justice
Jackson calls its "curiously involved history." The major issue concerned the old problem of allegation and proof: was the defendant
convicted under the portion of the statute that he allegedly violated?' o The litigation extended over three years, and although the
Court upheld the state it did so only after a searing examination.
Cole indicates that despite retrenchment in other cases from the position, developed also in Thornhill, that a statute abridging speech,
including picketing, must be valid on its face, the Court is not. yet
ready to return to the language of the parent case, Gitlow v. New
York: ". .. every presumption [must] be indulged in favor of the
validity of the statute."20
Four other cases conveniently hang together, since despite special
elements in each case all involve peaceful picketing. Three of them
arose from state courts, and Frankfurter applied his balance-of-interest
theory for a majority of the Court in two and for a plurality in the
third. Interestingly enough, the problem of racial discrimination
entered this arena, which usually involves conflicting economic values.
A group, banded together in a political organization known as the
1oSee Frankfurter, J., in Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 316 U.S. 525, 564 (1949)
(dissenting opinion).
17338 U.S. 345 (1949).
'Isd. at 352, n.3: "Q. What happened after Louis Jones gave the signal and
said 'Come on, boys'? A. They flew up like blackbirds and came fighting."
19The conviction was reversed in the Supreme Court of Arkansas; a second
conviction, affirmed by the same court, was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court on certiorari, since it appeared that the conviction was based on a provision
of the statute for which violation Cole had not been tried. A further interpretation by the state court was sustained by the United States Supreme Court; see 338
U.S. 345, 346 (1949).
20268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 89 (1940), the
Court stated: "Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned,
there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not
the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permis-
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Progressive Citizens of America, sought through picketing to induce
a grocer to hire Negro clerks in proportion to the number of Negro
customers. Under the California holdings this activity involves racial
discrimination, in this instance against the whites, and is illegal. In
Hughes v. Superior Court21 the United States Supreme Court, with
three justices concurring, sustained the right of the California court
to declare that its public policy opposes racial discrimination and that
even peaceful picketing cannot be utilized to hamper this policy.
The three justices, Black, Reed, and Minton, who merely concurred in this race-picketing case dissented the same day in a situation
that to their taste was too far removed from Giboney. A used-car
dealer, who employed only himself and his family, successfully enjoined union pickets attempting to force him to abide by union practices. Since the Washington court announced that the public policy
of the state favored small business and self-employed entrepreneurs,
the United States Supreme Court, in International Brotherhood v.
Hanke,22 sustained the injunction. The dissenters and the majority
differ fundamentally in degree only. Mindful that public policy is
2
an unruly horse, they divide on how firmly to apply the bit. 3

The one case that arose under federal law involved a violation of
the anti-secondary boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act 2 4

Six

justices sustained an injunction against a union agent who picketed
a construction job on which a sub-contractor employed nonunion
electricians. Three justices dissented, apparently on the basis of
statutory interpretation.25 Mr. Justice Burton, who wrote the majority
opinion, emphasized that, since the states may limit picketing, Congress
sible conduct and warns against transgression." Thornhill further relied to a con-

siderable extent on the doctrine of clear and present danger, discussed infra p. 241.
21339 U.S. 460 (1950). The three concurring justices did not accept the balancing-of-interests theory; they merely cited Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336

U.S. 490 (1949).
22339 U.S. 470 (1950).
23For the proposition that legislatures and courts should be restrained in projecting their own ideas under the guise of public policy, with the result that their
predilections control constitutional rights, see Note, 26 NoTRE DAME LAW. 664
(1951).

But see Rehmus, Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 30 ORE. L. Rr-v. 115

(1951).
241ntemational Brotherhood, Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
25Reed, Jackson, and Douglas, JJ. Cf. the dissenting opinion in NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); also see Local 74
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951), decided the same day. Douglas, J., did not participate
in the picketing cases arising in state courts.
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may do likewise; he made no attempt to distinguish the First and
6
Fourteenth Amendments.2
These observations illustrate a trend: the Court in judging peaceful picketing cases is rejecting free speech standards. When picketing
is involved there is no talk of clear and present danger, the hallmark
of orthodox speech cases. 27 Unfortunately, too much still remains
of Thornhill, too little clarification of Giboney, and perhaps too little
implementation of Ritter's Cafe; but, since most picketing involves a
conflict between management and labor for economic benefits, Frankfurter may well succeed in his efforts to sever this problem from those
conflicts that are essentially concerned with the communication of
ideas for the benefit of public enlightenment.
NONPROTEGrED SPEECH
If the Court waters down Thornhill, a majority still finds much
28
comfort in other language left by Mr. Justice Murphy:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These indude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace."
Murphy probably intended that these words be referred to sparingly,2 9 but they are freely quoted to limit speech in a variety of contexts.
Beauharnaisv. Illinois3o is an outstanding example of the use of
these words to establish a new and controlling principle in delineating
the area of protected speech. The case sustains the constitutionality
2s341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951). See Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949), for
a contrast in the presumption of statutory validity.
27The doctrine of dear and present danger is discussed infra, p. 240.
28Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); cf. Chase, J., concurring in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 236 (2d Cir. 1951).
29Black, J., concurring in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 739 (1952),
states: "The Chaplinsky Case makes no such broad inroads on First Amendment
freedoms. Nothing Mr. Justice Murphy wrote for the Court in that case or in any
other case justifies any such inference."
3072 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952).
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of group-libel statutes, which are attempts by legislatures to control
tirades against groups, classes, religions, races, and societies that if
made against individuals would be libelous and punishable. 31 Ordinary libel, of course, protects only the individual. Competent scholars who have inquired into the merits of these statutes generally
doubt their wisdom.32 Indeed, the few group-libel statutes on the
books have not met with marked success,3- and one state court has
declared its version essentially unconstitutional. 34 To our present
inquiry, however, Beauharnais is important because of the general
discussion and development of the problem of speech found in the
five opinions filed in the case.
The majority, again led by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and including
the Chief Justice and Justices Burton, Clark and Minton, relied on
35
the Murphy quotation and sustained the statute:
"Libellous utterances, not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us
or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase
'clear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend
that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon
a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in
the same class."
Not all of the justices, however, were content to rely on this young
doctrine of nonprotected speech. Mr. Justice Jackson found that he
was able to reach the same result through applying the traditional
clear and present danger test; and, although in the particular case
31

1LL. STAT. ANN. C. 38, §471 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1951) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place . . . any lithograph, moving picture,
play, drama or sketch, which . . . portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion [and] which
... exposes the citizens .. . to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive
of breach of the peace or riots."
32
Riesman, supra note 7; Tanenhaus, supra note 7; Note, 61 YALE LJ. 252
(1952), but see 254, n.9, 255, n.14.
33
Note, 61 YALE 252, 255 (1952).
34State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
3572 Sup. Ct. 725, 735 (1952). The "speech" was actually a handbill inviting
two million signatures for a petition to the mayor and city council of Chicago.
The problem is the old one of forming boundaries between white and Negro
neighborhoods, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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he found that Illinois had provided inadequate defenses for persons
accused of violating the statute, he envisioned that state government
could protect groups under statutes that broadened the defense. His
reasoning, of course, would necessitate reversing each conviction lacking full evidence that the words used by the offender created a dear
and present danger of injuring groups.3 6 With the majority of the
Court the showing of injury is not a necessary element.
Justices Black and Douglas arrived at an opposite conclusion.
They pointed out that group libel has never been within the scope
of prohibited speech as measured by the First Amendment; they relied on those cases that apply the guarantees of the First Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment; and they concluded that the
conviction, which appeared to them to be a denial of the right to
petition rather than a problem in group libel, ought to be reversed.
They have reaffirmed their belief in unfettered speech except under
37
the most compelling circumstances.
These views present a dichotomy. Some varieties of speech are
not types of "free" speech at all; these accordingly are not constitutionally protected. The remaining varieties are tested by dear and
present danger rules, which vary in definition in different cliques of
justices, and are constitutional in accordance with the outcome of
the test.
The dear and present danger doctrine, so often interpreted,
stretched, compressed, and twisted since Holmes gave it birth in a
famous 1919 opinion,38 can be conveniently restated. It arose in a
federal case in which the Court unanimously felt that, despite the
absolute prohibition in the Constitution against acts of Congress in
abridgement of speech,3 9 some outer limit could nevertheless be set
by Congress to protect the general community and to restrain 0 un3872 Sup. Ct. 725, 746 (1952). Reed and Douglas, JJ., also dissented at p. 741
on grounds discussed infra p. 240.
3772 Sup. Ct. 725, 726 (1952).
38Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
39U.S. CONsr. Amend. I, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-

dom of speech ...."
40No serious writer today questions that some limitation can be placed on
speech. The writer espousing the most libertarian views is Professor Meiklejohn,
but even he concedes that some speech, such as libel and slander, may be regulated, FaE SPFEcH 18 (1948). See Chafee, Thirty-five Years with Freedom of

Speech, supra note 4, who states that Meikeljohn would maintain "complete immunity of all speech on public questions ...."
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toward individuals. Holmes gave a rule to define that outer limit: 41
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
In 1925, in a far-reaching opinion, the Court asserted the principle
that free speech is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
case, Gitlow v. New York, 4 2 stated that the Supreme Court would, in
appropriate cases, limit the attempts of state governments to control
speech. The Court has consistently reaffirmed this power despite a
marked inconsistency in the application of it. In fact, the Court on
occasion makes a field day of declaring unconstitutional state acts
aimed at speech and communication; 43 and yet at other times,
such as the present, it shows considerable restraint. 44 To understand the assumption by the Court of this additional power of review as late as 1925 requires a study of the tragic, tortured, melancholy, and inconsistent history of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
45
partial sketch suffices here.
41Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Professor Chafee declares,
supra note 40, that the acceptance of this test by the Court constituted "Holmes'
inestimable service to free speech." But see Frankfurter, J., concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida," 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946): .'Clear and present danger' was never
used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a
formula for adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by
being taken from its context."
42268 U.S. 652 (1925).
43The earliest occasions occurred during the coalition of Hughes, C.J., and
Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts, JJ. See Frank, Book Review, I 3. PuB.
LAW 138, 139 (1952), and cases cited therein. Later instances arose with the victories of Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ., joined on occasion by Jackson, J., as in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); by Vinson, C.J., as in Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); or by Reed, J., as in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U. S. 1 (1949).
4See Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV.
L. RFv. 1 (1951), for general discussion and copious citations leading to an explanation of and apology for the present-day refusal by the Court vigorously to
strike down state and federal statutes. An interesting aside is the fact that the
author was Frankfurter's law clerk.
45For a standard account of the adoption of this amendment see FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1908).
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The Winding Path of the Fourteenth Amendment
Early after the War between the States and the imposition of the
Fourteenth Amendment upon the seceding states as a condition precedent to their re-entry into the Union, Mr. Justice Miller wrote the
majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases.4 6 The import of
the decisions in those cases led him to state: "No questions so far
reaching and pervading in their consequences ... have been before
this court during the official life of any of its present members."4 7
Further, he believed that the Amendment would be called into question only to protect members of the Negro race.48
With this limited estimate of the nature and seriousness of the
Amendment, the Court put it to rest by construing it into almost
meaningless phraseology. 49 At the time, the opinion was generally
greeted as a buttress for states' rights. 50 The perennial Federalist
was, of course, unhappy. 5' Years later, lawyers were able, through
a technical tour de force, to persuade the Court to enlarge the concept of the Amendment. By a process similar to that of shifting gears,
the Justices concluded that the Slaughter-House Cases applied only
to the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
52
and that the due process clause meant something else altogether
This something else was first interpreted to permit the Court to
invade the province of the states and to strike down attempts of
state governments to regulate economic and social conditions. 53 Later
4616 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
47Id. at 67.
45Id. at 81.
4
91n brief, the Court listed a few privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, such as the right to go from one part of the country to another,
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U.S. 1868), and implied that this is all that was
meant by the entire amendment. The case was largely argued in terms of privileges and immunities and not in terms of the succeeding phrase that speaks of
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. For a short,
able treatment of this entire problem see FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEcIsIONs 306-324 (1950).
SOWAIREN, Tit

SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 532 (1947).

r'Id. at 539.
'2See Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HAy.
L. REv. 431 (1926).
!5E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.

45 (1905).
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the Court extended its power to strike down state attempts to regulate civil liberties.54 In an about-face during the New Deal the
Court essentially surrendered its power to annul state activity in the
economic and social sphere 55 when not affected by the commerce
clause.56 In the field of civil liberties, however, the Court, like the
caissons, keeps rolling along.5 7
This new phase of judicial review led lawyers to ask which of
the civil liberties are protected against state interference and to what
degree this protection extends. There are, basically, two answers.
One recurrent but always minority solution is that the Bill of Rights
should be substituted for the words "due process"; 58 the Court should
protect the individual against the activity of his state government, in54

E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931).
5SWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934). Professor Shulman early suggested that the Court might
properly review civil liberty cases and leave to the legislatures and Congress the
regulation of economic matters, Comment, 41 YALE L.J. 262 (1931). This view
was given the most explicit expression on the Court by Stone, J.; see United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938); Braden, The Search
for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 579-593 (1948); Dowling,
The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases, 41 COL. L. REv. 1160
(1941).
56Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (state cannot control competition by
denying milk facilities to a distributor engaged in interstate commerce, even in the
absence of Congressional regulation); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Emplym't
Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951) (preempted by federal statute); see 5 U. oF FLA.
L. REv. 205 (1952).
57
Even here the Court is slowing down. See Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and

Present Danger," 27

NOTRE DAME LAW.

325 (1952); Richardson, Freedom of Ex-

pression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1. (1951). But the Court
has not reversed itself, and statutes still fall, Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct.
777 (1952) (censorship of motion pictures prohibited); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (restriction on freedom of religion). But cf. Zorach v.
Clauson, 72 Sup. Ct. 679 (1952); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (restriction on speech); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (restriction on
press).
58Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725,
736 (1952): "And we have held in a number of prior cases that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the specific prohibitions of the First Amendment equally applicable to the states." See Black, J., dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947); cf. dissenting opinion of Murphy, J., id. at 123. This problem is
thoroughly considered by Fairman and Morrison in Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
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cluding his judiciary, to the exact extent that it protects him against
Congressional activity. In other words, the Court should see to it
that a person is not convicted in the county courthouse for an offense
for which, by virtue of the Bill of Rights, he could not be convicted in the federal building.59
The prevailing view, however, found expression in 1947 in a full
opinion with the usual acrid dissents. 60 The Court decided that the
due process clause does not protect individuals unless the states violate notions "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 6' 1 These
notions may or may not correspond to those liberties protected by
the first eight amendments; they are judged on such frequently uttered but rarely explained standards as "reasonableness," "weighing
of interests," and similarity to past adjudications.62
Returning more specifically to the problem of free speech, the
Court under the guidance of Chief Justice Hughes agreed that free
speech is one of those notions "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."6 3 Indeed, all of the rights of the First Amendment enjoy that
status. 64 One difficulty still remains: granting that free speech is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as a right implicit in the con59
1n Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), the Court held that a conviction that would have violated the Fifth Amendment if done by the Federal Government did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when done by a state; in Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court permitted evidence to be introduced in
a state case that would have violated the Fourth Amendment as applied in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See Bartley, Federal Review of State Criminal
Appeals, 5 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 119 (1952).
6oAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The case could have been decided
on the authority of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
olPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937). This phrase by Mr. Justice
Cardozo has become nearly as troublesome as the phrase "clear and present danger."
See Black, J., dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
62United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search without warrant
deemed reasonable); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (evidence admissible
despite unreasonable search); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search
without warrant deemed reasonable under facts shown); Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (cruel and unjust punishment); Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942) (counsel not necessary in every trial).
63Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.

359 (1931).
6'Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (speech and assembly); West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (religion); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
(press); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (speech).
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cept of ordered liberty, is this free speech exactly the same as the
free speech protected by the First Amendment? As is to be expected,
the justices disagree on the answer. Jackson in Beauharnaissaid no;
Black and Douglas said yes; and the others on that occasion chose
not to commit themselves.
To recapitulate, the Beauharnaisdecision, despite dissent and concurrence, decided that the problem was not a free speech case at all.
Group libel is not entitled to constitutional protection.
Unlike libel, sacrilegious speech is protected speech, to be limited,
if at all, by the clear and present danger rule. This spring the Court
reversed itself to declare that, since movies constitute a great medium
of communication, their display to the public demands the fundamental protection accorded older forms of speech. 65 By implication,
it suggests that obscene films will receive no protection at all. The
rationale also permits the conclusion that libelous films or "fighting
words" films are unprotected forms of communication. 6
Loose Drafting of Prohibitions
Even in those cases not substantially within the ambit of constitutional protection, the Court may demand that governing bodies
seeking to regulate speech do so through statutes, regulations, or
customs that are artistically drawn or enunciated. The vagueness of
the statute in Beauharnais caused Mr. Justice Reed to dissent, since
the statute there in part permitted convictions of all persons who
portray the "lack of virtue" in others or who expose others to "derision" or "obloquy." 67 He found it difficult to determine whether
the conviction was under a valid or an invalid portion of the statute. 6s
These procedural safeguards provide the defense of prior restraint.
6sBurstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952) (state attempt to ban sacrilegious movies), overruling Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S.
230 (1915); see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
In Gelling v. Texas, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952), in a memorandum decision citing
the Burstyn case, the Court struck down a city ordinance giving a board of
censors power to ban any movie "prejudicial to the best interests of the people."
66See especially Reed, J., concurring in Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777,
783 (1952).
6772 Sup. Ct. 725, 741 (1952). Douglas, J.,joined in this dissent. Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), for a charge to a jury held to be too broad.
68Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940); see Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rv.
533 (1951); Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1208 (1948).
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Recently a city asserted its authority to prevent a group of Jehovah's
Witnesses from using a public park for a religious meeting. The city
had enacted no ordinance on the subject, but custom had long dictated that persons wishing to speak in the park obtain permission from
the city authorities. 69 Similarly, in another case New York City
officials denied permission to a preacher to speak in Columbus Circle,
since the city fathers suspected that he would continue, as he had
done in the past, to rail against other religious groups and thereby
cause an unseemly incident. 70 Without elaborate opinions, the Court,
through the chief justice, reversed the two convictions for the reason
that police cannot arbitrarily place prior restraint on speech. Even
though the Court will allow the authorities to prohibit some types
of speech altogether as well as to limit public speech to specified times
and places, some questions must be answered in order to decide (1)
whether the type of speech is nonprotected speech; (2) whether the
type of speech is protected generally but in the particular instance not
protected; or (3)whether the type of speech is protected generally
and in the particular instance protected. 71 Someone must hear the
speech or judge its limitation in terms of a "dearly drawn, narrowly
limited" statute.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
2
A table conveniently depicts a simple analysis:7

6ONiemotko v. Maryland, 840 U.S. 268 (1951).
70Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
7lJackson, J., in Kunz v. New York questions the propriety of presuming the
invalidity of state statutes and the validity of federal statutes. He contends also
that prior restraint is not an absolute defense. See Freund, supra note 67, Part
I. In Geuss v. Pennsylvania, 72 Sup. Ct. 860 (1952), the Court reaffirmed the
authority of Kovacs v. Cooper, 386 U.S. 77 (1949). A group of Jehovah's Witnesses had been fined for violating an ordinance prohibiting the use of sound
amplifying equipment in the business district. The United States Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question, Douglas, J., dissenting. The Kovacs ordinance, which prohibited "loud and raucous" noise from
amplifiers, was adjudged a "narrowly drawn" regulation. The ordinance involved
in the Geuss case outlawed all use of sound equipment in the downtown area.
A new twist in the captive audience problem arose in Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollack, 72 Sup. Ct. 813 (1952), which sustained the practice of furnishing radio
broadcasts on streetcars and city buses. The captive audience idea underlies in
part the religious cases, Zorach v. Clauson, 72 Sup. Ct. 679 (1952); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
72Professor Frank has popularized the use of tables. See his series The United

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss3/1

16

Smith and Kittleson: Free Speech (1949-1952): Slogans v. States' Rights
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
TABLE I
A - Nonprotected Speech

Type
Libel, obscenities, fighting
words

B - Protected Speech

Defense
Poorly-drawn
statute, prior
restraint, arbitrary action

Type

Defense

All speech not No clear and
in A, excluding present danger
picketing

The discussion so far has probed only those cases involving picketing, which is not reflected in the table, and the growing body of
decisions that fall within part A of this device. It is obvious that this
table does nothing more than emphasize two different kinds of speech.
Type B, to be presently considered, includes all speech cases that are
judged by the clear and present danger doctrine, which unfortunately shows itself to be more poetic than precise.3
It is not necessary to review all the opinions employing this
phrase in order to conclude that the words "clear and present danger"
have been subjected to two markedly different interpretations. One
view employs the phrase to include the idea that speech -indeed
communication - is in a preferred position in the hierarchy of constitutional values. It should, therefore, be abridged under the most
serious and urgent circumstances only.74
States Supreme Court, 19 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 165 (1952) (1950 term), 18 U. OF CHI.
L. REv. 1 (1950) (1949 term), and earlier articles in the series. See also Frank,
Court and Constitution: The Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. REv. 400 (1951); Note, 65
HARV. L. REv. 107, 178 (1951). But see Smith, Book Review, 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
267 (1950).
73Jackson, J., concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951),
warned against ensnarling the Government in a "judge-made verbal trap"; the
Chief Justice, in the same opinion, stated that he has shown "the indeterminate
standard the phrase necessarily connotes," id. at 516. Frankfurter, J., found the
phrase "not a substitute for the weighing of values," id. at 543. See CaRoozo, Law
and Literature, in SELECTED WRrriNos 338, 347 (1947).
74
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
561 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); West Va. State Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115 (1943); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). The notion of preferred position first appeared in a
footnote to United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938): "There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Consti-
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The second and recently prevailing interpretation is evidenced in
Feiner v. New York.75 A young college student, who espoused the
views of the Progressive Party, made a street-corner address in which
he used violent language to criticize local and national officials. He
also stated, "The Negroes don't have equal rights; they should rise
up in arms and fight for their rights." Members of the crowd pushed
and shoved; one listener threatened to snatch the speaker from the
platform; and the police after warning him to desist finally arrested
him.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who led the
majority in the picketing cases and in Beauharnais, had to content
himself with a concurrence.7 6 The chief justice wrote the majority
opinion and affirmed the conviction.77 Substantially, the argument
is that a riot constitutes an evil that the state can prevent; that the
speech by the college boy created a clear and present danger that a
riot might occur; and that consequently the city and the state did
not infringe the Fourteenth Amendment in punishing the student
for speaking as he did. Whatever else this interpretation may be, it
is dearly something other than the preferred-position doctrine.
Although in Feiner Mr. Justice Black makes no direct reference
to the clear and present danger test, he closely adheres to the preferredposition interpretation of the rule and is disheartened to see the
phrase applied to so trivial an incident. He states bluntly that the
student was punished for expressing unpopular views and that the
opinion of the majority in refusing to scrutinize the findings of fact
in these cases opens the way to allow police officers virtually unsupervised discretion to stop speeches.78 Justices Douglas and Minton,
tution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." The phrase "pre-

ferred position" was first used in the dissent of Chief Justice Stone in Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 608 (1942), judgment vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
The last victory for the doctrine was Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), although the decision actually turned on a narrower point. See the dissent of Frank-

furter, J., id. at 8. The most recent statement of the phrase appears in the dissent
of Douglas, J., in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 745 (1952).
75340 U.S. 315 (1951).
76See the wry article by Rodell, The Supreme Court is Standing Pat, The New
Republic, Dec. 19, 1949, p. 13: ". .. with Frankfurter so busy preserving for posterity the precise pattern of his thinking processes in special concurrences and
separate dissents...."
77Reed, Jackson, Burton, and Clark, JJ., joined in the opinion of the Court.
78340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
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however, in an opinion by the former, accept clear and present danger
as a test and find it wanting when applied to the facts. They suggest
with Black that the main fault may be with the police, who have a
duty to protect speakers." The contrast between their opinion and
that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is marked. Justices Black, Douglas,
and Minton adhere to preferred-position dialectics; in his concurrence
Frankfurter does not rely on clear and present danger language at
all. He suggests that the New York Court of Appeals is competent to
handle the facts, 8 0 that its opinion should be accorded considerable

weight, and that the United States Supreme Court should not overturn "a fair appraisal of facts made by State Courts in the light of
their knowledge of local conditions." 8' 1
It is the difference in rationale between the Vinson and Frankfurter opinions that gives trouble. The former clings to clear and
present danger language but so limits it as to arrive at the same conclusions as the latter, who rejects the rule and relies on a theory of
balance of interests, with a presumption in favor of state acts and decrees.8 2 It is perhaps this very difficulty that has led the Court, in
three years, to mention the phrase in only four of seventeen cases; 3
and of these four cases only two have definitely turned on clear and
present danger.84
NATIONAL DEFENSE

The greatest impact on the law of free speech during the past
three years has resulted from decisions that involved the problem of
79M. at 329.
sOThe New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the conviction, People
v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E.2d 316 (1950).
81340 U.S. 268, 287 (1951).

82The unlikelihood of a merger of the two views in the near future is indicated,
in part, by the persistence that Reed, J., shows in scrutinizing statutes and in pre-

suming their invalidity in state contexts. See his dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 741 (1952).
S3Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); American Communications Ass'n CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
S4Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951). In American Communications Ass'n CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393
(1950), certain language suggests the influence of clear and present danger as interpreted by Vinson in Feiner; see United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 211
(1950), for an analysis of the Douds case by Judge Hand.
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the Communist Party. 5 They presented themselves in varying contexts. Of these, only one was actually concerned with a criminal
prosecutions 6 In four other situations the Court passed on attempts
by federal, state, and local governments to purge Communist Party
members from public payrolls.8 7 The deportation of an alien for
past Communist membership introduced a more specialized problem
and opened for discussion conflicting attitudes toward immigrants.88
Finally the Court reviewed an aspect of the President's Employees'
Loyalty Program and for the first time faced the problem whether
the restrictions of the First Amendment are applicable to the executive branch of the Federal Government as well as to Congress.89
Few doubt the grave danger of world Communism; the question is
whether the means used to restrain subversion are constitutional.
The big case is Dennis v. United States.90 It lasted for months on
end, tested the temper of a distinguished district judge,91 invited
long opinions by a court of appeals presided over by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, and finally reached the United States Supreme Court.
In all of these forums the judges upheld the conviction of eleven
Communist Party leaders accused of conspiring to teach the overthrow of government by force and violence.92

BsSee SALVADORi, THE RisE OF MODERN COMMUNISM (1952); Note, 1 STAN. L.
REv. 85 (1948). Cf. statement in the House of Commons by Winston Churchill

on the desirability of free speech despite the language of the "Red" Dean of Canterbury, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1952, Sec. 4, p. 2E, col. 6. See also the statement
of the immunity granted Jacques Duclos, officer of the French Communist Party,
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1952, Sec. 4, p. 2E, col. 7.
86Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
87These regulations require that certain groups of persons take anti-Communist
oaths and disclose affiliations, past and present, with organizations advocating violent overthrow of government. Adler v. Board of Educ., 72 Sup. Ct. 380 (1952)
(school teachers); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (city
employees); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (election candidates); American Communications Ass'n CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (labor
union officials).
ssHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 72 Sup. Ct. 512 (1952).
8sJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
90341 U.S. 494 (1951).
-lUnited States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, Sacher v. United

States, 72 Sup. Ct. 451 (1952) (lawyers for the eleven Communists held in contempt).
92The nine-month long trial was presided over by Judge Harold Medina, then
judge in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
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Congress just prior to World War II enacted the law under which
these Communists were put in jail,93 in an effort to gear America to
protect herself against Communists and Fascists. Similar statutes are
sanctioned by history. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were
attempts by men of great rectitude such as John Adams to protect
the nation against the excesses of the French Revolution, but their
constitutionality is doubtful. 9 4 In any event, these statutes did not

reach the United States Supreme Court, since the election of Thomas
Jefferson to the presidency in 1800 caused their lapse.95 In this connection it is interesting to note Jefferson's personal view: the suppression of speech although not available to the Federal Government
should nevertheless be available to the states. The problem to him
was less one of liberty than the allocation of public power. 98
After the rise of the Jeffersonians the Federal Government left
United States Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the convictions, although
its members differed on the applicability of the clear and present danger rule,
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). Chief Judge Hand and

Judge Swan took the view explained infra, p. 250. Judge Chase, concurring,
asserted that the Gitlow majority is law; that the statute "prohibits only the
expression of one belief, viz., that action should be taken to overthrow the government by force"; that such an expression is not protected by the First Amend-

ment, id. at 235.
93Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (Supp. 1951), enacted June 28, 1940. Only
§§2 and 3 of the Act were applicable: one forbids the "teaching and advocacy"
of the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence, the other
outlaws any attempt or conspiracy to teach or advocate violent overthrow. The
indictment charged in part that the defendants "did conspire . . . to organize the
Communist Party of the United States of America, a . . . group . . . of persons
who teach and advocate the overthrow . . . of the Government . . . by force and
violence, and . . . to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing
-..the Government ....
" N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1949, p. 13, col. 1. The Dennis
prosecution was only the second under the statutory provisions involved. The
first prosecution, that of the Minnesota Trotskyites, was not passed upon by the
United States Supreme Court, Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943). The trial took place several months before the
United States entered World War II. Socialist Workers' Party leaders in Minneapolis were convicted for conspiracy to advocate overthrow of government and insubordination in the armed forces, a charge fully supported by the evidence. The
Court of Appeals relied on Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
94See Jackson, J., dissenting in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 747
(1952).
95The entire problem is ably discussed in MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM (1951).
96See discussion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves, MILLER, CRIsis OF FREEDOM 169 (1951).
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radicals essentially alone 97 until it joined with state governments during World War I to enforce laws against spies and malefactors.98
Later, in the twenties, both levels of government acted to subdue
Bolshevists. 90 Schenck v. United States, 00° the federal case, and Gitlow
v. New York,101 the state case, invite re-examination. In both cases
all of the justices recognized that state and federal governments can,
at least under certain conditions, limit speech. Holmes and Brandeis
wished to apply the dear and present danger test to both situations.
A umanimous Court in Schenck agreed to this proposition, but found
that measured by it the speakers could still be convicted. In Gitlow,
however, the application of the rule, as Holmes illustrated in his
dissent, required the reversal of the conviction; consequently, the
Court rejected the rule as applicable to the Gitlow type of situation,
0
drew a fine distinction between Gitlow and Schenck, o2
and upheld
O7This does not take into account a brief interlude of Civil War excesses; see
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866).
OsThe Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, prohibiting conspiracies and attempts
to obstruct recruiting and enlistment, gave rise to a number of federal prosecutions, including Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
The only case arising under the Espionage Act during World War II to reach the
Supreme Court was Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
09The two landmark cases that sustained state convictions under statutes outlawing advocacy of violent overthrow are Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). But cf. Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Congress, however, rejected all proposed peacetime sedition laws; federal suppression was restricted to
deportation and censorship in the customs; see CHAFEE, FREE SEECH IN THE
UNrrm STAraTs 169, 442 (1941).
100249 U.S. 47 (1919), affirming the conviction under federal law of a group
of radicals for conspiring to cause insubordination in the armed forces and to
obstruct recruiting. Schenck was the first important free speech case decided by
the United States Supreme Court.
101268 U.S. 652 (1925), affirming a conviction under a state anti-anarchist statute
for circulating writings urging the necessity of militant revolutionary socialism.
There was no evidence that anyone was actuated by the publications. The statute
was similar to the Smith Act, upon which were based the convictions in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Smith Act goes further, however, in
that it makes conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of government a criminal
offense.
1021n Schenck the defendant had used specific language; a statute forbade inciting insubordination in the armed forces; the connection between the language
and the insubordination could be tested by the phrase "clear and present danger."
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the conviction on the ground that a state can suppress speech as long
as the regulation is "reasonable."
Under the chief justiceship of Hughes the Court, for the first time,
began to strike down statutes that regulated speech and press. 103
Although it declared no federal regulation invalid as an abridgement
of speech, the implication of the cases involving state regulations
clearly suggested that federal restrictions would be tested similarly.
From these and later cases the doctrine of preferred position
emerged.104 It expresses itself in a two-fold manner: (a) statutes
regulating speech will be carefully searched for invalidity rather than
presumed to be valid as in the Gitlow case; (b) if the statute or regulation survives the presumption of invalidity, the speaker is nevertheless free to talk unless his words create a clear and present danger.
Against this background it is desirable for the sake of clarity to
analyze the various opinions in Dennis. The decision soundly jarred
the clear and present danger test. Although during the past three
terms the justices have used the phrase in only four cases, 10 5 the
The Schenck restriction on speech was tested under the First Amendment; that in
Gitlow under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Gitlow the statute prohibited the
language itself; consequently, the Court reasoned, the clear and present danger
test was inapplicable, since the state can reasonably prohibit language that might
tend to cause violent overthrow of the government. This distinction is accepted
by Vinson, C.J., in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 506 (1951). For a discussion of the respective powers of federal and state governments to punish crime
and suppress violence, see Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present
Danger" Rule, 38 VA. L. REV. 143, 149 (1952).
103Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (display of red flag as symbol
of opposition to organized government); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(scandalous newspaper articles); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distribution of handbills); Schneider v. Irvington,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (door-to-door solicitation).
4

'10 See note 74 supra.
5

10 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952) (group libel); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Communist conspiracy); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951) (street-corner speech); American Communications Ass'n CIO
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (non-Communist oath). Cases not using the phrase:
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952) (movie censorship); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 72 Sup. Ct. 512 (1952) (alien deportation); Adler v. Board of Educ.,
72 Sup. Ct. 380 (1952) (school teacher's non-Communist oath); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (subversive organization listing
by attorney general); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (city
employees' non-Communist oath); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56
(1951) (election candidates' non-Communist disclosure); Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation); Niemotko v.
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rule has doubtless been a brooding omnipresence in their minds; and
in Dennis all five opinions, representing the eight participating justices, attempted to cope with and accepted, rejected, or modified the
concept. The final result indicates that, concerning this test, something new has been added or much has been taken away.
The Chief Justice, for a plurality of the Court, emphasizes first
the conceded power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the Government by force and violence. He underscores the
purpose of the statute: it is not to prohibit change but to require
that the change be made through constitutional procedures. The target
of the prohibition is not discussion but advocacy of a serious evil.
Overlooking the difficulty of this dichotomy, 10 he attempts, secondly,
to calibrate the clear and present danger slide rule for use in the
case at hand. Drawing on six overthrow-by-violence cases from the
past, including Schenck, he discovers that in each of these situations
the defendants were guilty of overt acts and that the difference between the majority and the minority views arose over the quantum
of evidence necessary to show a clear and present danger to the
safety of the Government. 0 7 In three of these cases Holmes and
Brandeis dissented, and the Chief Justice seeks to minimize these
dissents as differing only in degree and not involving any divergence
of principle. He further argues that the greater menace of Communist Party tactics today lessens still more the slight differences in
the opinions of more than twenty years ago. Thirdly, having committed himself to follow the general learning of the rule, he feels
obliged to explain his divergence from it; for, since no one suggests
that the activity of the eleven Communist Party members posed an
imminent danger - as distinct from probable danger - of overthrow
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (Bible talks in city parks); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951) (street-corner speech); Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950)
(picketing); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950)
(picketing); Building Serv. Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950)
(picketing); Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949) (picketing). Jackson, J., dissenting in Kunz v. New York, supra at 300, thought it "peculiar that today's
opinion makes no reference to the 'clear and present danger' test."
206One writer criticizes the Court's attempt "to make constitutional protection
as large as discussion but not as large as advocacy." Antieu, Dennis v. United
States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REv. 141, 148 (1952). Cf.
Holmes, " .. the only difference between the"expression of an opinion and an
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result." Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
lo7See cases cited note 98 supra.
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of the United States Government, 08 a strict application of the rule
to the facts logically demands acquittal.
The Chief Justice therefore responds with the most law-changing
paragraph in the opinion; in it he adopts the interpretation of the
Court of Appeals by Chief Judge Learned Hand. Courts must "...
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.109 This statement of the text, as one commentator puts it,
produces what may be called a "perhaps and probable" test." 0 As a
logical result of this viewpoint, persons advocating ideas that may
lead to unlawful acts can apparently be placed in jail prior to the
time their advocacies indicate success. The United States will not
wait until revolutionary dynamite is ready to explode before it snuffs
out the fuse. And all of this is explained within the framework of
the clear and present danger rule, which has turned out to be anything but a semantic strait jacket"'
The verbose concurrence of Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been
dubbed "symptomatic of the intellectual liberal in our times, torn
between opposing absolutes."' 12 Boiled down, it is the same position
he took in Feiner when a state rather than a federal regulation was
involved. He argues that the First Amendment does not prohibit a
balancing of competing interests; primary responsibility for adjusting
these interests belongs to Congress; the right of a government to
maintain its existence, an important aspect of sovereignty, is the
stronger of the competing interests. Consequently, since Congress
has not acted unreasonably, the Court should not intervene. He is
consistent here with his concern to balance interests in picketing
cases, breach of peace cases, or, for that matter, interstate commerce
cases. 1 13 Further, his opinion reflects admirable frankness in refusing
'osSee Douglas, J., dissenting in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581
(1951). The Government admitted at argument that the traditional application
of clear and present danger would call for reversal, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3166 (1951);
Note 65 HARV. L. RFv. 107, 130 (1950).
lo9Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494, 510 (1951).
llOAntieu, Dennis v. United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5
VAND. L. REv. 141, 143 (1952).
"'lThe phrase "semantic straitjacket" was coined by Vinson, C.J., in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
"'2Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 165,
223 (1952).
"'See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
564 (1949).
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to rewrite the clear and present danger rule to cover an entertainable
probability. His concurrence closely resembles the opinion of the
majority of the Court in Gitlow. It was from this reasoning that
Holmes and Brandeis dissented; it was the avoidance of this reasoning that in part caused Chief Justice Vinson to recast the law.
Indeed, the Frankfurter concurrence in Dennis and the opinion of
the Chief Justice raise the question why the Dennis case was not decided on the basis of Gitlow. Professor Corwin suggests that the long
opinions and rationalizations result from the desire of the Court to
treat an important problem with deference." 4 Another view might be
that the Court considered much of Gitlow overruled sub silentio to
make way for the emergence of the Holmes dissent, and thought it
better to start again from scratch. In fact, the attempt of the Chief
Justice to explain the difference between the Holmes dissent and the
present holding buttresses the notion that the Gitlow majority is
no longer persuasive and that the Gitlow dissent is law, at least as
recast by Judge Hand.
There is a third possibility, however, namely, that the Court may
recognize that Gitlow is applicable, if at all, to state activity and
cannot be applied mechanically to permit restrictions in the federal
field. In Beauharnais,for example, Mr. Justice Jackson envisaged a
vast variety of situations that could be limited by state action and
only a few by Congress. He spoke tellingly of the limitations that
Holmes placed upon his own rule of clear and present danger to the
effect that a distinction might properly be drawn between an attempted abridgment of speech by a state government and an attempted abridgment by Congress." 5 In other words, Gitlow may do
for state courts; the acceleration of Communism since 1925 might,
were Holmes living, persuade him to join the Gitlow majority to
solve a 1952 situation; but the Smith Act is federal legislation and
should be interpreted by a strict application of the First Amendment.
In concurring in Dennis, however, Mr. Justice Jackson does not
rely on his Beauharnais preoccupation with federal and state power;
instead he flatly rejects the clear and present danger test for use in
all Communist conspiracy cases. In terms of Table I he places Communist conspiracy in the slot of nonprotected speech. He leaves dear
1'4Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 325
(1952).
12r72 Sup. Ct. 725, 752 (1952)

(dissenting opinion). See Brandeis, J., concur-

ring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927).
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and present danger language for use "in the kind of case for which
it was devised," 116 such as a hot-headed speech on a street corner, a
red-banner parade, flag-salute refusals, or the circulation of a few
incendiary pamphlets. To sustain the conviction of the Communist
Party conspirators he would rely on the law of conspiracy, which
alone can be a crime apart from the consummation of its purposes.
A crime in and of itself pre-empts the application of clear and present
danger considerations. To bolster this technical demonstration is the
earthy realization that Communists, like wayward children, cannot
expect the prizes if they will not play the game.
Mr. Justice Jackson drew a majority over to his view on Communism in the context of resident aliens. In Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy"1 he rejects any assumption that the denial of the right to teach
violent overthrow is also a denial of free speech. In admitting that
it is no small task to draw the line at which advocacy of political
methods shades into incitement to violence, he argues that the
Court must nevertheless make that distinction. Obviously referring
to the preferred-position view of Justices Black and Douglas, he finds
it equally undesirable to permit incitement to violent overthrow until
it seems certain of immediate success.
Accepting in this one instance these views, the majority realizes
that the problem involves an alien, not a citizen. Since the Court
has consistently indicated that Congress can place any limitation it
pleases on the entry of aliens,"" Congress can certainly deport Communist aliens. Much of the Jackson language in Harisiades can be
taken as pure garnishment; much, however, must mean that singly
or in groups Communist speech officially advocating violent over116341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (concurring opinion).
11772 Sup. Ct. 512 (1952). An alien, thirty years a resident of the United
States, was ordered deported for Communist Party membership which had terminated prior to 1940. The Government made no effort to show any present or
contemplated danger from his activities; the majority of the Court, however,
found no violation of freedom of expression. Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., conceded in dissent that there would be no objection to deportation if a hearing
showed the alien to be dangerous and hostile to the United States Government,
but he pointed out that Congress did not proceed by that standard.
11sChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Chinese exclusion);
see Boudin, The Settler within Our Gates, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 266 (1951). Murphy,

J., concurring in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 166 (1945), asserted that the
clear and present danger doctrine applies to deportation proceedings notwithstanding the fact that the United States may deny entry without being compelled to
justify the exclusion.
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throw of any other type of government is ipso facto outside all legal
protection and is unprotected speech.
Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Dennis, lash out in
righteous indignation against the complete rejection of the preferredposition doctrine and mutilation of the clear and present danger
rule.'1 9 Stressing that the Court has just affirmed the convictions of
persons who had said and written nothing but who had planned to
talk at a later date, the two dissenters charge that the Court has
abandoned all principles of free speech. Douglas, in lawyerlike fashion, marshals the facts and precedents to urge that the conviction
fail. He recognizes that freedom to speak is not absolute and that
Congress can prevent seditious conduct, but he finds neither a dear
and present danger as Holmes defined it nor any conspiracy for the
present overthrow of the United States Government. Both dissenters
imply an awareness of the sheer hopelessness of an immediate return to those older opinions that captured the language and substance
of the Holmes-Brandeis position; but in concluding passages each
Justice reaffirms his faith, refuses to recant, and -as the senior justice puts it - hopes that "this or some other Court will restore the
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they
' 20
belong in a free society."
Taken as a whole, the case is a self-imposed limitation on judicial
review. During his tenure as chief justice Marshall once wrote that
it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what
the law is; but, concerning free speech cases, Dennis holds that the
law is whatever Congress says it is, as long as Congress is reasonable.
The decision has been assailed as a restriction unprecedented in the
United States on the right to hold opinions and express them -"a
21
disaster in the history of democracy."'
The limitation of speech in Dennis was foreshadowed by American Communications Association CIO v. Douds,122 which, however,
119341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951); see note 108 supra.

120341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
2l2Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. oF

CHI.

L. Rv.

165, 189 (1952).
122339 U.S. 882 (1950). The statutory provision requires the filing of a nonCommunist affidavit by officers of any union wishing to utilize the facilities of the
National Labor Relations Board. The legislative objective is the prevention of
political strikes instigated by Communist infiltrators into union leadership. The
means to the end is the withholding of governmental privileges from Communistled unions.
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is almost a subject unto itself. In brief, Douds held that labor unions
cannot share in the benefits of favorable labor legislation if they
maintain Communist Party officers; that Congress can regulate commerce even though to some degree this regulation affects speech.
Although the act of Congress imposes no punishment and does not
in fact directly limit speech, the result of the decision causes Communist labor union leaders to lose their jobs because of their beliefs.
In a more important sense, Douds illustrates a growing body of doctrines and practices that indirectly limit speech. Another example of
these indirect restraints is the attempt by state governments to in1 23
sure that their schools are free from Communist Party teachers
124
The
and that their city employees have no subversive affiliations.
rationale of these cases is that the problem is not one of speech at all;
it smacks somewhat of the old Holmesian maxim that no man has
a constitutional right to be a policeman.125
In one other instance, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath,1 26 the Federal Government sought to limit indirectly free
speech, or, more specifically, freedom of belief. Here, however, the
Court timorously invalidated actions of the attorney general, who
in response to Congressional demands had compiled a list of dangerous organizations as an aid in hiring and firing subversive bureaucrats.
Several organizations on this list complained that not only were they
denied a hearing but that publication in effect punished their members for political beliefs.
The Court split badly. Only one opinion, Reed's dissent, got as
many as three votes. Together with Vinson and Minton, he denied
completely the allegations of the organizations, and particularly stated
that no free speech issue was apparent. Burton, joined by Douglas,
sustained an injunction in favor of the organization and read the
123Adler v. Board of Educ., 72 Sup. Ct. 380 (1952), upheld a law disqualifying
from school employment any person who advocates or is a member of an organization which advocates violent overthrow of government. Black, in dissent, said
despairingly, "This is another of those . . . enactments . . . which make it
dangerous to think or say anything except what a transient majority happen to
approve at the moment ...." Id. at 387.
124Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). An ordinance requires every city employee to swear that since a date five years prior to the effective date of the ordinance he has neither espoused forceful overthrow of
government nor affiliated with a group advocating such aims. Accord, Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
12SMcAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
126341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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Court a lesson in pleading. He argued that the attorney general by
his demurrer admitted the allegations that the organizations were
blameless. Of course, the listing of admittedly innocent organizations
is beyond the scope of the power conferred upon the attorney general
by the appropriate executive order. Although not accepting this
reasoning, Frankfurter and Jackson, in separate concurrences, asserted
that these listings violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in that the organizations were placed on the list without a fair
hearing. Black, with indirect support from a separate opinion by
Douglas, considered the case in free speech terms and, as had Judge
Edgerton in the court of appeals, 127 concluded that the executive
branch abridged speech, since the First Amendment despite its language applies not only to Congress but to all branches of the Federal
Government.
It was therefore an unusual coalition that on sundry grounds reversed the executive. The thought, however, that the Court was
tightening its control over civil liberties perished with a subsequent
case,1 28 decided 4-4 without opinion, upholding the entire loyalty
program, of which the listing by the attorney general is a part.
The most unusual twist in this field of indirect limitations on
speech came last year in Breard v. Alexandria,129 which distinguished
to death a similar 1943 adjudication.13 In the earlier case Mr.
Justice Black, for a Court including such well-known adherents to the
preferred-position doctrine as Stone, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge,
ruled invalid as an invasion of free speech and press an ordinance
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation without prior consent of the
occupant. The facts of the 1943 decision involved Jehovah's Witnesses
who were seeking to distribute religious handbills. Reed dissented,
with Roberts and Jackson, on the ground that no invasion of free
speech or press was discernible; ideas could still be expressed elsewhere without violating the privacy of the home. In Breard Reed
was able to get a majority composed of himself, Jackson, Frankfurter,
127177 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion). United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947), implies that the First Amendment forbids not
only Congress but all branches of the Federal Government to abridge free speech.
12SBailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (dismissal of government employee
on grounds of disloyalty sustained).
129341 U.S. 622 (1951), 5 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 196 (1952). An ordinance forbade

solicitors to approach. homes unless invited. Defendant was a magazine subscription salesman.
2sOMartin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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and three Truman appointees to reverse essentially the older Black
opinion. Actually, the opinion did not gainsay the right of persons
to distribute religious tracts without prior permission from each
householder, but it clearly upheld city ordinances that prohibit newspaper and magazine vendors from house-to-house soliciting."31 Chief
132
Justice Vinson, in his preoccupation with interstate commerce,
found that the regulation was an undue burden on it; but Justices
Black and Douglas, true to form - and, in this case, precedent found at least an indirect limitation on freedom of expression.
STATE AND FEDERAL DISTINCTIONS

Table II sets out the number of times the Court during the past

three terms sustained restrictions on speech; the number of times it
refused to sustain a restriction; and the nature, federal or state, of
the restriction adjudicated.

133

TABLE II
TOTAL

STATE REGULATIONS

FED. REGULATIONS

(17 cases)

(12 cases)

(5 cases)

Sustained

Not
Sustained

18

4

Sustained
9

Not
Sustained

Sustained

3

4

Not
Sustained
1

This comparative nudity of numbers contrasted with the diverse
131The Florida Court considered the problem one of private rather than public nuisance, of tort rather than criminal law, and declared a similar ordinance
violative of the Florida Constitution, Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938).
13'Cf. American Communications Ass'n CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
13'The following cases were not included in this table but are possibly pertinent to the free speech problem: Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 72 Sup. Ct. 813
(1952) (transit radio); Geuss v. Pennsylvania, 72 Sup. Ct. 360 (1952) (sound truck);
Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (government loyalty program); Gerende
v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (non-Communist oath); Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (contempt). In these cases the Court
denied certiorari, dismissed appeal, or did not develop speech issues in the opinion;
the balance of figures is not altered by these omissions. See Harper, What the
Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 354
(1951).
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rationalizations of the several opinions indicates a wide area of agreement and a reasonable fellowship in judgment; the Court struck down
regulations in only four cases. 34
TABLE III
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Vinson

13

4

8

4

5

0

Burton

12

4

8

4

4

1

Clark

11

3

9

3

2

0

Minton

11

5

7

5

4

0

Reed

11

6

7

5

4

1

Jackson

11

6

9

3

2

8

Frankfurter

10

7

7

5

3

2

Black

4

13

3

9

1

4

Douglas

0

12

0

8

0

4

Table III more truly suggests the present state of confusion.
Douglas, for example, voted in no instance to uphold regulations of
speech; the chief justice voted for them on three fourths of the ballots.
But, even so, charts do not tell the whole story; 135 they eliminate
the seething resentments, the bitter debates, the hackneyed norms
and the search for new ones that characterize the struggle. "All dedare for liberty and proceed to disagree among themselves as to its
134Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). The language in the majority
opinions in the last of these cases suggests that the regulating authorities can still
achieve their wishes by drafting a better statute, and the Burstyn case forebodes
no major reinforcement to the deteriorating armor of free speech. See note 65
supra.
235E.g., Jackson, J., dissenting in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 746
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true meaning."'1 6 In drawing conclusions the student must depend
on enlightened guesses and subjective surmises, of which we offer
three:
1. Although old phrases may remain, three problems heretofore
treated as speech problems will in actuality be treated as problems unto themselves: (a) picketing; (b) nonprotected speech,
such as libel, group libel, violence, obscenity; (c) indirect limitations, such as right to employment, right to labor
legislation benefits, rights of resident aliens.
2. In the cases still to be treated as free speech problems, the clear
and present danger test will be ornamental rather than basic
to the decision; the preferred position thesis will not be employed in the majority of opinions; and, although the new
doctrine that must ultimately emerge to explain the recent
cases is not yet clearly apparent, the Court will allow wide
power to the states and to Congress to pass "reasonable" legislation for the control of speech.
3. The Court in speech contexts will probe federal restrictions
and state restrictions with essentially the same standards.
Some writers find that the present Court is retreating in its defense of civil liberty; 137 one or two writers accept the cases, more or
less willingly, as understandable and not necessarily unfortunate. 13
Divergence of view depends on the predilection of the observer as to
the function of the Supreme Court. The essential role of the Court,
we submit, is that of umpire to the federal system. 13 9 We give content
to this figure of speech - drawn by Professor Braden largely to illustrate the commerce clause - in a due process context.
Specifically, this function suggests that the Court review a state
(1952), voted not to sustain the regulation but on grounds easily curable by the
regulating authorities. It might have been more accurate to place his vote as one
sustaining the regulation.
136Reed, J., in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625 (1951).
' 3Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 19 U. oF CH. L. REv. 165 (1952);
Murphy, Free Speech and the Interest in Local Law and Order, 1 J. PUB. L. 40

(1952).
138E.g., Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NoT DAME LAW.
325 (1952); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65
H v. L. REv. 1 (1951).
139See Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. or GHi. L. Ray. 27 (1942).
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regulation as a problem in the allocation of power and invalidate it
only if the state has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Similar tests
used by the Court to judge the regulations of states in the field of
interstate commerce, when permissible, or state regulation of its
economy as limited by the due process clause should be followed in
speech cases. Other issues, such as public order against personal liberty and privacy against free speech, should be left to the state
courts.

1 40

The Frankfurter solution logically follows as the best one offered
by members of the Court as pertains to state regulation of speech.
His view, as well as the results, but not the reasoning, of those justices
who still adhere to dear and present danger language but reject the
preferred position interpretation," permits a maximization of power
at the state level and a minimization of supervision by the federal judiciary; accordingly it supports a national tradition of variety rather
than similarity, diversity rather than uniformity. Under these holdings the Court does not say, as it did in 1922, ".... neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of
the United States imposes any restrictions about 'freedom of speech'
."142 but it reaches almost that point. In effect the Court is saying
140The eminent scholar Charles Warren, writing in 1926, foresaw a danger to
the federal system arising from the Gitlow dictum, which siphoned the First Amendment speech guaranty into the Fourteenth Amendment. "One may well view with
some apprehension the field of interference with State legislation which a logical
extension of the Gitlow case doctrine must inevitably lead the Court. For, if as
now assumed, the right of freedom of speech contained in the First Amendment
to the Federal Constitution is a part of a person's 'liberty' protected against State
legislation by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the right of free exercise of his
religion contained in the First Amendment must be also a part of a person's
'liberty,' similarly protected against State action. And on this ground, the United
States Supreme Court may be called upon to pass on State laws as to religion
and religious sects-a subject which, of all others, ought to be purely the concern of the State and its own people, and in no wise subject to interference by
the National Government . .
. [T]he simple word 'liberty' will have become a
tremendous engine for attack on State legislation-an engine which could not
have been conceived possible by the framers of the first Ten Amendments or by
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment itself . ...
" Warren, The New
"Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HAy. L. REv. 431, 458, 462 (1926).
141The use of the term "preferred position" by a justice does not necessarily
mean that he adheres to it. See Reed, J., in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88
(1949).
242Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
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that it will not limit the states except for unreasonable and arbitrary
action. More precise it will not be, but the shift is plain.
In the federal sphere the Frankfurter solution, which makes little
distinction between a state law and an act of Congress, is not persuasive, though predominant. Unless judicial review is to be abandoned, the Court has a duty to construe federal regulations in the
same manner that the state courts construe state regulations. In
judging Congressional acts the question of allocating power would
seldom arise. 143 Indeed, the Supreme Court has a higher obligation,
in view of the First Amendment. It is the rejection of responsibility
by the Court that leads to Dennis, a decision that is objectionable in
that it bypasses the First Amendment, overlooks an early lesson in
history, and disregards the learning of former justices as expressed
in the clear and present danger rule. It is small consolation that at
least two voices demurred. Ironically, the result of the moment could
have and perhaps should have been obtained by state action.
One author insists that the states will not adequately safeguard
free speech and that the Supreme Court must therefore jump into
the breach.144 Although one might reply that Dennis is harsher than
Feiner, it is true that much work needs to be done by state bars
and benches and other powerful institutions 145 to insure greater safeguards to this historic right. Courageous men and women should
assert the right of free speech in their individual stations. These
considerations, however, raise different questions altogether, to be
dealt with at other times and places. As the deacon said of the preacher who left the customary general exhortation to righteousness in order
to discuss the evils within his congregation, "He done quit preachin'
and gone to mindin' other folks' business."
143A power problem might present itself in a context such as American Communications Ass'n CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), in which the restriction on
expression depends on the grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. A different factual situation might raise the question whether the speaker
is in interstate commerce and under federal authority. Another aspect of federal
allocation of power is that among branches of the Federal Government, Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); see especially Edgerton,
J., dissenting in the Court of Appeals, 177 F.2d 79, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
44Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts, and First Amendment Freedoms,
4 VAND. L. REv. 620, 642 (1951); cf. Bartley, Federal Review of State Criminal
Proceedings,5 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 119 (1952).
'45See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 219 (1943).
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